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In 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the U.N. 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the “Declaration”) 
by a vote of 143 states in favor and only four states against.1 As one 
of the key missions of the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations since its establishment in 1982, the Declaration aims to 
make progress towards rectifying the perceived inadequacy of 
existing international human rights law.2 Past international human 
rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, emphasize the individual but lack language protecting 
culturally distinct indigenous communities.3 In response, the drafters 
of the Declaration set out to create an international instrument 
expressly recognizing a collective right to protection from state 
action that could undermine an indigenous group’s ability to remain 
a culturally distinct people.4 
 
 1. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 
61/295, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 *Oct. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Declaration]. 
 2. See, e.g., Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in 
Light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 1141, 1173-76 (2008) (seeking to preserve indigenous cultures by 
recognizing the necessity for affirmation of self-determination, self-help, and re-
empowerment of indigenous groups). 
 3. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) 
A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (containing no mention of group or 
collective rights). 
 4. See, e.g., Robert T. Coulter, The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: A Historic Change in International Law, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 
539, 539-43 (2009) (lauding the Declaration as signaling the end of the view that 
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In its dissent, the United States explained several perceived 
problems with the Declaration, including a concern that the 
Declaration lacks adequate guidance on the resolution of conflicts 
between collective indigenous rights and individual human rights.5 
Although non-binding, the Declaration is seen as carrying significant 
weight in outlining indigenous collective rights.6 It encourages 
nations to look to the principles embodied in the Declaration in 
developing their own domestic policies.7 Proponents argue that the 
Declaration could come to reflect international customary law as its 
principles are injected into domestic judicial rulings and legislative 
acts.8 Proactively addressing the conflicts perceived by dissenters 
may speed this process and further the goals of indigenous peoples.9 
Courts and legislatures seeking to apply the collective rights 
embodied in the Declaration will be forced to grapple with the 
conflict between individual and collective human rights.10 To explore 
 
issues concerning indigenous peoples are a temporary problem that will eventually 
become moot due to natural assimilation). 
 5. See Robert Hagen, U.S. Advisor, Explanation of Vote on the Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 13, 
2007), http://www.treatycouncil.org/ PDFs/US_DRIP.pdf (citing flaws in the 
Declaration’s treatment of self-determination; land, resources & redress; collective 
rights, specifically that, under the fundamental human rights doctrine of universal 
applicability, no group of individuals may have rights not afforded to another 
group of individuals within the same nation-state; and general welfare). 
 6. See Coulter, supra note 4, at 551-52 (arguing that formal declarations by 
every nation are not necessary to obligate all nations to adhere to human rights 
principles adopted by many nations and binding as customary international law). 
 7. See UN News Center, United Nations Adopts Declaration on Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp? 
NewsID=23794&cr=indigenous&cr1=# (urging U.N. member states to integrate 
indigenous rights into their policies, even though the Declaration is a non-binding 
document); see also Coulter, supra note 4, at 546 (arguing that the Declaration, as 
an official statement, carries “political and moral force, creating the basis for it to 
become binding customary international law”). 
 8. See Coulter, supra note 4, at 546 n.43, 551-52 (noting that the Declaration 
can be used by a variety of people, including leaders of indigenous people, public 
officials, and educators as a tool in domestic advocacy and legislative efforts). 
 9. Cf. Dwight G. Newman, Theorizing Collective Indigenous Rights, 31 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 273, 280 (2007) (cautioning careful consideration of the concerns 
of dissenting nations and encouraging development of an adequate and sound 
theoretical response). 
 10. See id. at 283-84 (offering that, while "probabilistic," conflicting interests 
do not logically or necessarily preclude the possibility of compatible individual 
and collective rights regimes). 
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one of these conflicts, this Comment will focus on the tension 
between the individual human right11 to enjoy one’s own culture12 
articulated in Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights13 (“ICCPR”), and the collective indigenous right to 
self-determination and autonomy in internal affairs embodied in 
Articles 1 and 4 of the Declaration.14 Part II of this Comment briefly 
traces the historical and modern treatment of indigenous peoples 
which provide the underlying justification for indigenous rights 
instruments, such as the Declaration being necessary and distinct 
from individual human rights.15 Part III argues that the Declaration 
embodies a flawed rationale found in previous court decisions which 
gives greater weight to collective human rights at the expense of 
individual human rights. Moreover, host-nation review of indigenous 
group membership decisions promotes protection of individual 
human rights without undermining indigenous peoples’ right to 
internal self-determination.16 Part IV recommends that indigenous 
peoples cede partial control of reviewing membership decisions to 
the host nation to ensure that individual human rights are respected.17 
Part IV further recommends that the Declaration should be amended 
to more effectively guide courts in balancing individual human rights 
 
 11. See Hagen, supra note 5 (noting that the addition of collective rights to the 
existing body of individual human rights begs the question of which should prevail 
in a dispute between them). 
 12. See Johanna Gibson, The UDHR and the Group: Individual and 
Community Rights to Culture, 30 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 285, 287 (2008) 
(relating the unique indigenous link between access to land and enjoyment of one’s 
own culture through the example of Australian aborigines). 
 13. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179 [hereinafter ICCPR] (expressing minority 
communities’ rights in a state to enjoy their distinct culture, practice their religion, 
and use their own language). 
 14. See Declaration, supra note 1, arts. 1, 4 (“Indigenous peoples have the right 
to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights . . .”). 
 15. See discussion infra Part II (linking the history of treatment of indigenous 
peoples to the development of collective group rights, and discussing current court 
treatment of conflicts between collective and individual rights). 
 16. See discussion infra Part III (arguing that excessive deference to collective 
rights will lead to violations of individual human rights unless there is a just 
system for review of membership decisions). 
 17. See discussion infra Part IV.A (recommending that indigenous groups form 
agreements with the host nation to provide for appellate review of tribal 
membership decisions by the courts of the host nation). 
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and collective rights.18 
I. BACKGROUND 
It is from a history of injustices that modern activists of 
indigenous people’s rights continue to draw caution and strength.19 In 
stark contrast to the eras of assimilation and termination, the current 
era of indigenous peoples is said to be that of self-determination, 
which affords indigenous peoples the right to remain a distinct, often 
self-governed group: a longstanding goal of indigenous peoples 
groups.20 This Comment briefly traces the background of indigenous 
peoples and control of membership decisions, as well as the 
Declaration, ICCPR, and court decisions dealing with the conflicting 
guidance between the two.21 
A. HISTORY OF OPPRESSIVE TREATMENT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
The history of oppressive programs enacted by nations upon 
indigenous peoples is undeniable.22 Whether conquered or colonized, 
stories of death and displacement are common to indigenous peoples 
around the globe.23 The indigenous peoples that survived and were 
 
 18. See discussion infra Part IV.B (seeking amendment of the Declaration to 
encourage future accession by the dissenting nations by incorporating a balance 
between collective and individual rights). 
 19. See Declaration, supra note 1, pmbl. (reiterating in its preamble “that 
indigenous peoples have suffered from historic injustices”). 
 20. See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-
34, 49-72, 97-115 (2d ed. 2004) (recounting the history of indigenous peoples’ 
treatment and the current opportunities for indigenous peoples in international 
forums); Joshua Castellino, Territorial Integrity and the “Right” to Self-
Determination: An Examination of the Conceptual Tools, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 
503, 506-17 (2008) (outlining the history of territoriality and self-determination in 
the context of indigenous peoples). 
 21. See discussion infra Part II.A-F. 
 22. See generally Rebecca L. Robbins, Self-Determination and Subordination: 
The Past, Present, and Future of American Indian Governance, in THE STATE OF 
NATIVE AMERICA: GENOCIDE, COLONIZATION, AND RESISTANCE 88, 88-107 (M. 
Annette Jaimes ed., 1992) (detailing the history of host nation and indigenous 
people interaction in North America); Robert Yazzie, Indigenous Peoples and 
Postcolonial Colonialism, in RECLAIMING INDIGENOUS VOICE AND VISION 39, 39-
41 (Marie Battiste ed., 2000) (chronicling the forceful colonization of indigenous 
people in the United States, Canada, Africa, and Asia). 
 23. See Yazzie, supra note 22, at 39-41 (linking advances in warfare and 
transportation technology to increased colonization). 
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not enslaved or assimilated found it increasingly difficult to hold 
onto their lands.24 Through the right of conquest25 and doctrine of 
discovery,26 land clearly inhabited by indigenous peoples was 
declared uninhabited—a legal fiction known as terra nullius, which 
granted title to the conqueror so that the land could be put to more 
productive use.27  
In Canada and the United States, indigenous peoples were 
removed from their ancestral lands,28 occasionally through barter and 
treaty,29 seldom equitable in nature, and just as often through force.30 
What lands the indigenous peoples did retain were whittled down 
over time through programs aimed at terminating reserved lands and 
assimilating indigenous peoples into the mainstream.31 Those 
indigenous peoples who clung to their traditional ways found 
 
 24. See, e.g., THOMAS D. HALL & JAMES V. FENELON, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
AND GLOBALIZATION: RESISTANCE AND REVITALIZATION 6-11 (2009) (introducing 
examples of indigenous resistance to globalization and efforts of indigenous 
peoples to preserve traditional culture). 
 25. See Calvin’s Case, [1608] 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 398 (K.B.) (proclaiming “if a 
Christian King should conquer a kingdom of an infidel . . . the laws of the infidel 
are abrogated, for that they be not only against Christianity, but against the law of 
God and of nature . . .”). 
 26. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 591 (1823) (ruling that 
the principle of discovery applies, and therefore “the [indigenous] inhabitants are 
to be considered merely as occupants . . . deemed incapable of transferring the 
absolute title to others”). 
 27. E.g., Wiessner, supra note 2, at 1153 (noting that an important goal of the 
Declaration was delegitimizing the theory of terra nullius, a concept that treated 
the original inhabitants of conquered land as legally irrelevant). 
 28. See generally DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 63-70 (2007) (finding the removal of Native Americans from 
their land to be the conceptual predecessor to modern day deportation—the 
exercise of a nation's plenary power to exclude foreigners). 
 29. See Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian 
Treaty Abrogation: “As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth” 
— How Long a Time is That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601, 608-19 (1975) (detailing the 
canons of construction favoring the American Indians that were used to interpret 
treaties made between them and the United States, developed in order to inject 
some semblance of equality into the agreements). 
 30. See Yazzie, supra note 22, at 41 (concluding that superior technology 
enabled forceful eviction of indigenous peoples from their ancestral lands). 
 31. See generally HENRY E. FRITZ, THE MOVEMENT FOR INDIAN 
ASSIMILATION, 1860-1890 34-55 (1963) (reviewing arguments in favor of 
assimilation as the best alternative to exterminating American Indian culture and 
reservations). 
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themselves with limited resources and ever-shrinking domains often 
far from their traditional haunts.32 Poverty and reliance on 
government handouts became the norm for indigenous peoples living 
on reservations as modern society continued to develop and encroach 
upon them.33  
B. MODERN ERA OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
The reservation system, which sets aside land for indigenous 
peoples, persists as the most common state solution to 
accommodating indigenous peoples as distinct cultures.34 One of the 
major goals of indigenous peoples across the globe, however, is the 
recognition of a collective right to self-determination.35 As 
indigenous peoples secure greater representation in both domestic 
and international fora, they rightfully demand participation in state 
decisions that affect their way of life.36 Though the extent to which 
indigenous peoples are successful in this pursuit varies from nation 
to nation, the overall trend is moving towards greater respect for the 
right of indigenous peoples to exist as a culturally distinct group.37 
 
 32. See generally KANSTROOM, supra note 28, at 63-70 (describing removal 
era policies and jurisprudence). 
 33. Cf. Angelique A. EagleWoman, Tribal Nation Economics: Rebuilding 
Commercial Prosperity in Spite of U.S. Trade Restraints—Recommendations for 
Economic Revitalization in Indian Country, 44 TULSA L. REV. 383, 407-11, 423-26 
(2008) (blaming federal and state policies for restricting economic growth of 
American Indian Nations and requesting recognition of full sovereignty and a 
return to treaty making between American Indian nations and the U.S. government 
as a remedy). 
 34. See G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835 705-06 
(1988) (asserting that the initial impetus for creation of the reservation system in 
the United States was to forcibly separate the American Indians from white society 
because of “cultural differentness”). 
 35. See Coulter, supra note 4, at 543 (praising the Declaration as being a 
formal recognition of indigenous peoples’ collective right to exist as a distinct 
culture or society). 
 36. See id. at 553 (urging participation by leaders of indigenous groups in the 
political process to garner increased support for recognition by the United States in 
international declarations establishing indigenous rights). 
 37. See S. James Anaya & Siegfried Wiessner, Op-Ed., The UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Towards Re-empowerment, JURIST (Oct. 3, 
2007), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/10/un-declaration-on-rights-of-
indigenous.php (hailing the Declaration as a milestone that reaffirms the 
developing customary law in the indigenous rights field); see also Chidi 
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The United States affords a relatively expansive form of 
indigenous sovereignty to indigenous tribes. U.S. federal Indian law 
is rooted in the principle that tribes, as indigenous peoples, existed as 
sovereigns before colonization,38 and therefore retain powers of 
sovereignty not expressly abrogated by Congress.39 Though not as 
expansive as U.S. domestic policy, other countries also recognize 
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.40 For example, in the 
Awas Tingni case, South American indigenous peoples successfully 
reclaimed title to their ancestral lands by asserting a collective right 
to self-determination.41 Integral to the idea of self-determination is 
control of internal group affairs, such as determination of 
 
Oguamanam, Indigenous Peoples and International Law: The Making of a Regime, 
30 QUEEN’S L.J. 348, 373-87 (2004) (summarizing regional trends and state 
practice in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South America, 
Japan, Africa, the European Arctic Regions, and the Philippines as reflecting a 
positive posture towards indigenous causes). 
 38. See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 206 (Neil 
Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005) (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 
322-23 (1978)) (describing Indian tribes as holding “inherent powers of a limited 
sovereignty which has never been extinguished”); Vine Deloria, Jr., Self-
Determination and the Concept of Sovereignty, in NATIVE AMERICAN 
SOVEREIGNTY 118, 123 (John R. Wunder ed., 1996) (extolling the virtues of 
increased deference to tribal sovereignty as a remedy for the host nation's artificial 
control of community functions). 
 39. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557-63 (1832) 
(reinforcing the plenary power of Congress to abrogate any sovereign right of an 
Indian nation through litigation); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 
13 (1831) (establishing a guardian and ward relationship between the federal 
government and tribes); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587 (1823) 
(accepting the doctrine of discovery for the proposition that all title to lands are 
distributed by the conqueror). These three cases establish the principles of 
American Indian law and are collectively known as the Marshall trilogy. See 
Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal Self-Governance, 80 N.D. L. REV. 
691, 698 (2004) (explaining that the “Marshall trilogy” of cases is the first 
articulation of Indian Tribes’ position under federal law). 
 40. See Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual 
Structures of Indigenous Peoples’ Claims in International and Comparative Law, 
34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 189, 219 (2001) (tracing decolonization efforts of 
former European colonies to the rise of self-determination as a legal right). 
 41. See Jo M. Pasqualucci, International Indigenous Land Rights: A Critique of 
the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Light of the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 27 WIS. INT'L 
L.J. 51, 62 (2009) (discussing the Awas Tingni community’s struggle with 
Nicaraguan authorities which culminated in the Inter-American Court ordering the 
Nicaraguan government to demarcate and title ancestral lands back to the Awas 
Tingni people). 
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membership status, which is most often considered on genealogical 
or racial grounds.42 
C. BENEFITS OF MEMBERSHIP AND MEMBERSHIP GOVERNANCE 
An indigenous person is a citizen of the host nation in addition to 
his status as an indigenous person.43 Status as a member of a 
government-recognized indigenous group can determine legally 
whether one is entitled to certain benefits provided by the host 
nation.44 Historically, these benefits ranged from the basic right to 
live on the reservation, to usufructuary rights extending far beyond 
the reservation’s borders.45 Though membership status includes 
access to the reservation, there is typically no requirement that a 
member live within its borders.46 
Financial benefits may also be afforded to indigenous peoples.47 In 
Sweden, status as a member of the Sami indigenous people provided 
special reindeer breeding rights.48 In the United States, the Indian 
 
 42. See Rebecca Tsosie, American Indians and the Politics of Recognition: 
Soifer on Law, Pluralism, and Group Identity, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 359, 371-
86 (1997) (reviewing AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP (1995)) 
(recognizing Soifer’s view that indigenous identity poses a “significant challenge 
to American constitutionalism and liberal ideologies”); see also Kirsty Gover, 
Genealogy as Continuity: Explaining the Growing Tribal Preference for Descent 
Rules in Membership Governance in the United States, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
243, 250-54 (2009) (searching for the legal origins of the tribal preference for 
descent rules as a basis for membership). 
 43. See Eric Reitman, Note, An Argument for the Partial Abrogation of 
Federally Recognized Indian Tribes’ Sovereign Power over Membership, 92 VA. 
L. REV. 793, 858-63 (2006) (tracing the federal government’s duty to protect the 
rights of tribal members as its wards). 
 44. See id. at 816-17 (remarking that increased barriers to tribal membership in 
the United States may be related to maximizing the tribe’s prosperity and 
minimizing payout). 
 45. See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 
38, at 1122-23 (discussing the rights, similar to easements, that natives retained 
over traditional fishing, hunting, and gathering grounds). 
 46. See Gover, supra note 42, at 298 (noting many tribal members live off-
reservation). 
 47. Cf. Reitman, supra note 43, at 817-18 (cautioning that it would be naive to 
discount financial motivations in tribal membership decisions). 
 48. See 1 § RENNÄRINGSLAGEN [Reindeer Husbandry Act] (Svensk 
författningssampling [SFS] 1971:437) (Swed.) (permitting official Sami members 
to exercise reindeer breeding rights not available to non-members, whether 
ethnically Sami or not). 
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Gaming Act paved the way for successful casino operations which 
can provide generous income streams to members of the host tribe.49 
As these financial benefits grow, so does the import of determining 
status as an indigenous person in a just manner.50 
D. COLLECTIVE RIGHTS: U.N. DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
The concept of collective human rights is not universally 
accepted.51 Like the United States, other nations object to collective 
rights as conflicting with individual human rights.52 Despite the 
continuing debate, one of the main goals of the Declaration is to 
clearly signal to the international community that internal self-
governance should be recognized as a collective indigenous right and 
left in the control of the indigenous group itself.53 Article 4 of the 
Declaration emphasizes and clarifies the right to internal self-
determination.54 It specifically cites autonomy or internal self-
governance as necessary rights in order to exercise the right to self-
determination.55 Internal self-governance encompasses the right to 
control enrollment and disenrollment of members.56 
 
 49. See Gover, supra note 42, at 298 (explaining that while termination-era 
policies created economic hardships for some tribes, gaming and contracting 
opportunities provided economic benefits to others). 
 50. See id. at 244 (crediting the importance of tribal membership criteria to the 
deference federal governments give to such determinations and the resultant 
federal benefits conferred). 
 51. See Newman, supra note 9, at 280 (recognizing that the concept of 
collective, universal human rights is not unanimously accepted at a conceptual or 
moral level). 
 52. See id. at 278 (including Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom among the nations which have gone on record as opposing the idea of 
collective rights). 
 53. See Declaration, supra note 1, art. 4 (granting indigenous peoples the right 
to autonomy or self-government in internal and local matters). 
 54. See Caroline E. Foster, Articulating Self-determination in the Draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 141, 150-56 
(2001) (characterizing an indigenous group’s exercise of the right to self-
determination as a form of political participation in interactions with the host 
nation). 
 55. Declaration, supra note 1, art. 4. 
 56. See id. arts. 4, 33 (finding that in addition to the right to self-governance, 
indigenous peoples also have the right to determine identity and membership in 
accordance with their own traditional practices). 
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Self-determination for indigenous peoples as a group differs from 
that of nations or individuals.57 If full self-determination was 
afforded to indigenous groups, the logical end result could entail full 
independence and secession from the nation within which they 
currently reside.58 In fact, progress on the Declaration halted until it 
incorporated provisions to expressly disclaim any impact on 
territorial sovereignty of the host nation in its adoption of Article 
46.59 The form of self-determination adopted in the Declaration is 
that of “internal” self-determination. In one description offered by 
the Australians, “internal” self-determination is limited to helping 
enable indigenous peoples “seeking to assert their identities, to 
preserve their languages, cultures, and traditions and to achieve 
greater self-management and autonomy, free from undue interference 
from central governments.”60 In addition, “internal” self-
determination is seen as a collective or group right as opposed to an 
individual right.61 Deference to an indigenous group’s control of 
internal matters and self-determination is construed with a historical 
eye towards past treatment.62 
 
 57. See generally Castellino, supra note 20, at 505 (analyzing the individual, 
group, and national right to self-determination in the context of land rights). 
 58. See generally EYASSU GAYIM, THE ERITREAN QUESTION: THE CONFLICT 
BETWEEN THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE INTERESTS OF STATES 
191-94 (1993) (associating self-determination with the right to establish an 
independent state). 
 59. See Declaration, supra note 1, art. 46 (expressing the adamant rejection of 
any interpretation of the Declaration’s provisions which might suggest the right of 
any individual or group to violate the U.N. Charter, and also cautioning against 
acts which would threaten the territorial integrity of existing nation states). 
 60. See ANAYA, supra note 20, at 111 (quoting Australian Government 
Delegation, Speaking Notes on Self-Determination (July 24, 1991)). 
 61. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee 
under Article 5, Paragraph 4 of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR Concerning 
Communication No. 197/1985, Kitok v. Sweden, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. 
No. 40 (A/43/40) (Mar. 25, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 HRC decision] (upholding an 
indigenous group’s decision to deny membership to a former member who had lost 
membership status by temporarily abandoning work in the reindeer herding 
business). 
 62. See ANAYA, supra note 20, at 129-31 (finding that host nations must 
bolster rights which protect indigenous groups in order to eradicate the legacies of 
discrimination and past oppression). 
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E. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS 
In contrast to the aspirational, non-binding nature of the 
Declaration, the ICCPR carries the weight of a treaty.63 Adopted in 
1966, Article 27 of the ICCPR applies to ethnic, religious, or 
linguistic minorities located within host nations.64 It provides that 
those fitting the description must be afforded the right to enjoy their 
own culture with the other members of their group.65 Article 27 is 
seen as encompassing an individual right of cultural access by 
implicitly requiring preservation of the group in order for that culture 
to continue to exist.66  
The ICCPR is one of several international declarations and 
covenants which indigenous peoples have invoked with some 
success.67 The drafters of the ICCPR also provided for U.N. Human 
Rights Committee (“HRC”) oversight of the provisions through 
acceptance of an optional protocol.68 In countries such as Canada and 
Sweden, which acceded to the optional protocol, a petitioner may 
seek review by the HRC after exhausting domestic remedies.69 
 
 63. See ICCPR, supra note 13, arts. 1, 2 (declaring a covenant by the adopting 
states to follow the principles espoused within, while conforming with obligations 
of the U.N. Charter). 
 64. ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 27. 
 65. See id. (establishing also the right of minorities, when acting in community, 
to their own religion and language). 
 66. Cf. Gibson, supra note 12, at 315-17 (concluding that individual rights to 
culture implicate intellectual property declarations to protect cultural knowledge). 
 67. See Oguamanam, supra note 37, at 363-67 (listing successful international 
indigenous peoples’ laws as emerging from such sources as labor disputes, racial 
discrimination, and indigenous activism). 
 68. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (enabling the HRC to receive and 
consider communications from individuals alleging violations of the ICCPR). 
 69. But see U.N. Human Rights Comm., Lovelace v. Canada, Communication 
No. 24/1977, Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol, 2d-16th Sess., at 83, 
87, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (July 30, 1981) [hereinafter 1981 HRC Decision] 
(recognizing that while exhaustion of domestic remedies is usually required before 
an individual’s communication is admissible, in this instance, Canadian case law 
explicitly set the national Indian Act as controlling the issue). 
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F. COURT DECISIONS CONSIDERING MEMBERSHIP GOVERNANCE 
In Lovelace v. Canada, brought before the HRC through the 
optional protocol, a woman registered as a Maliseet Indian lost her 
status as a member of the indigenous community under federal—not 
tribal—law by marrying a non-member.70 Denial of membership 
based upon marriage to a non-member was limited to women 
marrying non-member men per the Canadian Indian Act71 and 
purported to reflect a history of patriarchal membership 
determinations within the indigenous community.72 Lovelace 
asserted among her claims that denial of membership deprived her of 
the “cultural benefits of living in an Indian community, the 
emotional ties to home, family, friends and neighbours, and the loss 
of identity.”73 The HRC noted that this claim fell most directly under 
Article 27 of the ICCPR which should protect those who were raised 
on a reservation, maintained ties with the reservation community, 
and wished to continue to do so.74  
The HRC found that while the Canadian Indian Act denied 
Lovelace her legal status as an Indian, she remained Indian 
ethnically, and by preventing her from living on the reservation as a 
right, she was impermissibly denied access to her own culture.75 The 
HRC determined that Canada must reasonably and objectively justify 
the imposition of statutory restrictions on an indigenous person’s 
access to the reservation with which they have ties.76 Finding no 
reasonable and objective justification for denying the right to 
residence based on Lovelace’s prior marriage to a non-member, the 
HRC found that Canada violated the ICCPR.77 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Indian Act, R.S.C. 2010, c. I-5, § 12(1)(b) (Can.). 
 72. See 1981 HRC Decision, supra note 69, at 84 (recognizing that patrilineal 
relationships were utilized in determining the foundation for legal claims). 
 73. Id. at 85. Petitioner’s claim under a gender discrimination theory was not 
addressed because the marriage took place six years before the ICCPR. Id. at 84, 
87. 
 74. See id. at 86 (associating the legal right to reside on the reservation to the 
rights of minorities guaranteed by Article 27). 
 75. See id. at 86 (finding that Lovelace’s several-year absence from the reserve 
since the time of her marriage did not remove her from belonging to the minority). 
 76. See id. at 87 (noting that the restrictions must also be consistent with the 
other provisions of the ICCPR). 
 77. Id. at 87 (holding that the denial of Lovelace’s right to reside on Tobique 
Reserve breached Article 27 of the ICCPR, even though she had married and later 
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The U.S. Supreme Court addressed indigenous control of 
membership in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.78 The petitioner in 
this case, a female member of the Santa Clara Pueblo Indian tribe, 
sought relief in federal court after her children were denied 
membership by the tribe due to her having a non-member husband.79 
This was in contrast to the freely admitted membership of children of 
men who married non-member women.80 The petitioner argued that 
her civil rights, as provided by the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”), 
were violated.81 The Supreme Court held that suits against the tribe 
under the ICRA are barred by its sovereign immunity from suit and 
that Congress did not expressly or implicitly abrogate this sovereign 
immunity from suit in passing the ICRA.82 The Court opined that 
Congress envisioned resolution of statutory issues under the ICRA as 
better addressed in tribal forums more familiar with tribal tradition 
and custom.83 In effect, the Court sanctioned a clearly discriminatory 
policy, one that would have probably been struck down had the rule 
been that of a state rather than an indigenous group.84 Academics 
have postulated that even if the United States previously acceded to 
the optional protocol, the HRC would have upheld the deference to 
membership rules enforced by the indigenous group itself.85 
 
divorced a non-member). 
 78. 436 U.S. 49, 51 (1978) (examining an Indian tribe’s ordinance that 
regulated tribe membership for certain female tribal members’ children). 
 79. See id. at 51-52 (submitting that the children’s membership was denied, 
even though the children were raised on, and as adults, continued to live on the 
reservation). 
 80. Id. at 51. 
 81. See id. (asserting a violation of Title I of the Act, which restricts the denial 
of equal protection of law by tribal rule on the basis of both sex and ancestry). 
 82. Id. at 59. 
 83. Id. (recognizing Congress’ desire for little intrusion into the tribes’ self-
government, as well as the knowledge of traditions and customs that tribal fora 
possess that federal courts lack). 
 84. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979) (invalidating a similar 
state law basing parental rights on the gender of the parent due to it not being 
“substantially related to an important state interest”). See also Kingsbury, supra 
note 40, at 211-16 (comparing Santa Clara and Kitok to other cases invoking the 
Optional Protocol). 
 85. See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW 1018-19 (5th ed. 2005) (claiming that the HRC, in its decisions in 
Kitok and Lovelace, expressly limited the application of ICCPR Article 27 to 
decisions to deny membership made by a national as opposed to tribal 
government). 
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The HRC again dealt with Article 27 in Kitok v. Sweden where an 
ethnic Sami individual was denied special reindeer breeding rights 
afforded to the indigenous group.86 Mr. Kitok lost this breeding right 
under a 1971 Swedish statute; providing that once a Sami engages in 
any other profession for a period of three years, he loses his status as 
a Sami herder and cannot re-assert those rights except with special 
permission.87 In the Swedish system, indigenous groups decide 
membership status first, but the decision may be appealed to the 
national judicial system if special circumstances are found.88 
Although both parties agreed that securing reindeer breeding rights is 
an integral part of Sami culture, it was the financial interest of the 
group to limit the number of Sami who can exercise the reindeer 
rights that led to Kitok’s denial of recognition.89 Sweden argued that 
exercise of one’s Article 27 rights are justified in a democratic 
society when necessary to further important public interests or 
protect the rights and freedoms of the people.90 The HRC added a 
State requirement that restrictions on individual membership 
decisions be reasonable and objective, as well as necessary to ensure 
the continued existence of the minority as a community.91 The HRC 
ultimately agreed with Sweden’s exercise of restraint in declining to 
grant Kitok member status and therefore Sweden did not violate 
Article 27. The HRC noted however that Kitok was still permitted to 
 
 86. See 1987 HRC Decision, supra note 61, at 221-22 (considering whether 
Sweden denied Kitok the right to enjoy his indigenous culture and therefore 
violated Article 27). 
 87. RENNÄRINGSLAGEN [Reindeer Husbandry Act] (Svensk 
författningssampling [SFS] 1971:437) (Swed.); see also 1987 HRC Decision, 
supra note 61, at 222 (stating that the Swedish Crown and the Lap bailiff instituted 
the statute in an effort to reduce the number of reindeer breeders). 
 88. See 1987 HRC Decision, supra note 61, at 229 (acknowledging that while 
the initial conflict was between a Sami individual and the Sami community, the 
existence of the Reindeer Husbandry Act, which permits an appeal to Swedish 
courts in the event the Sami refused an individual membership, constituted state 
action and triggered the responsibility of the state). 
 89. See id. at 229 (noting that regulating economic activity is generally an 
exclusive matter for the state, except when such activity is an “essential element” 
of an indigenous culture that wishes to protect its lifestyle). 
 90. See id. at 225 (arguing that the goal of the Reindeer Husbandry Act was to 
protect and preserve Sami culture, and that any restrictions on an individual’s 
exercise of rights should be weighed against this strong public interest). 
 91. See id. at 230 (noting the conflict between the purpose of the legislation—
to protect the rights of the Sami as a group—and the application of the legislation 
to a single member of that group). 
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engage in the reindeer business, just not as a right.92 
II. ANALYSIS 
The Declaration adds to human rights literature that is already 
crowded with several declarations and covenants.93 It endorses the 
analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court in Santa Clara which is overly 
deferential to the tribe in membership decisions.94 By doing so, the 
Declaration fails to offer a balanced approach to the resolution of 
conflicts between collective and individual human rights that arise in 
membership governance disputes.95 To ensure respect of individual 
human rights, host-nation review of indigenous membership 
decisions facilitates the nation ultimately responsible to international 
law obligations taking an active role in the membership decisions.96 
A negotiated agreement between the host nation and the indigenous 
group, balancing individual rights against collective rights, would not 
unnecessarily undermine the goals of self-determination.97 This 
Comment discusses each of these issues in turn. 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Gibson, supra note 12, at 292-99 (including, but not limited to, the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, and the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities) Additionally, the established 
international literature on human rights pertains to the protection of individuals, 
minorities, and intellectual property as relevant to the right to culture. See id. 
 94. See discussion infra Part III.A (asserting that the balancing approach of 
Kitok is fairer and preferable to the highly deferential approach of Santa Clara 
because it accounts for both the collective right of self-determination and the 
individual right to enjoy one’s own culture). 
 95. See id. (arguing that deference to collective rights is excessive when 
inquiries into membership governance are analyzed in terms of the collective right 
to self-determination without giving proper weight to the individual right to enjoy 
one’s own culture). 
 96. See discussion infra Part III.B (contending that the host nation’s court 
systems, which could provide a neutral forum to help ensure that a reasonable and 
objective justification was provided in cases of membership denial, should 
consistently be held as the nation’s final arbiter before a claim of violation of 
Declaration rights could proceed to international review). 
 97. See id. (claiming that the same rationale for the Declaration provisions that 
expressly limit the concept of self-determination to preclude secession from the 
host nation, support host-nation review of membership decisions). 
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A. THE DECLARATION FAILS TO OFFER AN APPROPRIATELY 
 BALANCED APPROACH TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN 
 COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS THAT ARISE IN 
 MEMBERSHIP GOVERNANCE DISPUTES. 
In failing to offer guidance on how to balance rights afforded 
indigenous peoples as a collective, and indigenous peoples as 
individuals, the Declaration endorses the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
deferential analysis in Santa Clara rather than the more appropriate 
balancing analysis set out by the HRC in Lovelace and Kitok. 
Whether nominally binding as a treaty, or only aspirational in nature, 
the Declaration purports to represent principles applicable across 
national boundaries, with the implicit goal of recognition and 
enforceability as customary international law.98 The Declaration 
unabashedly attempts to strengthen indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination as a collective human right.99 In linking internal self-
governance to self-determination, proponents of the Declaration 
frame control of membership decisions as a key collective right.100 
Deference to collective rights is excessive when an analysis entails 
inquiries into membership governance in terms of the collective right 
to self-determination without giving proper weight to the individual 
right to enjoy one’s own culture.101 As a standard to be pursued, the 
Declaration’s failure to appropriately balance collective and 
individual human rights could undermine its aspirational goals.102 
The Declaration encourages analysis of membership governance 
disputes in terms of collective self-determination rather than in terms 
 
 98. See Coulter, supra note 4, at 552 (characterizing the Declaration as a 
statement by the countries who support it that collective indigenous rights exist in 
customary international law, and must be respected with or without formal 
adoption). 
 99. See Declaration, supra note 1, art. 1 (specifying a collective right to 
enjoyment of international human rights law). 
 100. See id. art. 4 (declaring the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy in 
internal affairs). 
 101. See Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 248-50 (arguing that the current flexibility 
allowed in choosing a theory upon which to resolve individual versus collective 
rights allows evasion and abuse, and runs the risk of delegitimizing indigenous 
claims by polarizing political forces against them). 
 102. But see Declaration, supra note 1, pmbl. (characterizing the Declaration as 
embodying a standard of achievement to be sought by the international 
community). 
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of individual rights.103 In Santa Clara, the U.S. Supreme Court 
analyzed a membership dispute in terms of the impact on the tribe’s 
right to self-determination while discounting that its decision would 
deny a domestic forum to review the petitioner’s gender 
discrimination and community access claim.104 While recognizing 
that Congress, through the ICRA, codified an extension of individual 
civil and human rights to tribal members, the Court rationalized that 
providing a federal forum for review of the enforcement of those 
rights would undermine the tribe’s collective right to self-
determination to an impermissible degree.105 The Court further 
opined in Santa Clara that tribal courts are better equipped than 
federal courts to rule on membership decisions.106 A fair 
interpretation of the Santa Clara holding concedes that a tribal court 
possesses the best knowledge and expertise to determine the impact 
on the collective of granting membership status to an individual 
petitioner.107 On the other hand, the impact the indigenous group 
considers may be of a financial or political measure, rather than 
based on the impact a grant of membership status may bear on the 
collective cultural identity.108  
The Declaration fails to provide a standard on which to judge the 
 
 103. See, e.g., Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 190, 247 (differentiating five 
conceptual structures for indigenous peoples claims including 1) human rights and 
non-discrimination claims, under which the petitioner in Santa Clara may have 
prevailed, and 2) self-determination claims, under which the Court decided Santa 
Clara and embodied in the Declaration Article 4). 
 104. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61 (1978) (reasoning that 
Congress deliberately passed the Indian Civil Rights Act without an explicit 
provision providing for federal review of tribal enforcement of the statute). 
 105. See id. at 64 (finding that federal review of tribal membership decisions 
would contradict the legislative purpose of ICRA to protect tribal self-government 
by undermining tribal authority and imposing serious financial burdens on tribes 
defending federal lawsuits). 
 106. See id. at 65, 71 (reasoning that civil disputes arising under Section 1302 of 
ICRA often turn on issues involving tribal customs and traditions, which tribal 
forums may be best suited to address). 
 107. See Reitman, supra note 43, at 822-23 (relating the holding of courts that 
have relied on Santa Clara interpreting it to mean that internal tribal affairs, such 
as membership decisions, are not the appropriate subjects for federal courts, only 
tribal courts). 
 108. See id. at 801-03 (noting ways in which gaming tribes may abuse control of 
membership decisions, including disenfranchisement, disenrollment, and 
banishment). 
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equities of indigenous group membership decisions.109 Without a 
standard, the indigenous group may continue to arbitrarily disregard 
individual rights.110 In Lovelace, where the state—and not the 
indigenous group—made the membership determination, the HRC 
determined that the petitioner’s membership could not be denied 
without a reasonable and objective justification.111 The Declaration, 
through its emphasis on collective rights, supports the proposition 
that protection of internal self-governance should end the inquiry 
into whether a reasonable and objective justification exists in 
disputed membership decisions.112 
A more balanced approach is required in order to ensure that rights 
guaranteed to individuals, by international instruments such as the 
ICCPR, are not violated in membership decisions left entirely under 
the control of indigenous groups.113 Without a more balanced 
approach, indigenous groups retain free reign to make arbitrary 
decisions which violate anti-discrimination and other human rights 
laws.114  
 
 109. See Hagen, supra note 5 (justifying voting against the Declaration because 
the text was prepared through a flawed process and is both confusing and open to 
conflicting interpretation). 
 110. Cf. Klint A. Cowan, International Responsibility for Human Rights 
Violations by American Indian Tribes, 9 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 42 (2006) 
(asserting that “[t]ribal violations of U.S. international human rights obligations are 
attributable to the United States because the tribes . . . fall under the rubric of State 
organs[,]” and thus trigger the responsibility of the state). 
 111. 1981 HRC Decision, supra note 69, at 87 (finding that while restrictions on 
indigenous rights must be reasonable and objective, Article 27 must also be 
applied in light of other relevant Declaration provisions). 
 112. See Coulter, supra note 4, at 543 (commenting that the Declaration 
represents a formal recognition by the international community of the right of 
indigenous peoples to exist and their right to self-governance). 
 113. See Oguamanam, supra note 37, at 398 (concluding that support for 
indigenous people’s rights as customary law is premised on moral as well as legal 
theories, and that states must continue to protect the binding obligations 
comprising existing human rights law). But see, Newman, supra note 9, at 285 
(postulating that the relationship between individual and collective rights are 
internally bonded because groups with collective rights ultimately serve their 
individual members; thus, conflict between the two rights should be a rare 
occurrence). 
 114. See Tina Kempin Reuter, Dealing with Claims of Ethnic Minorities in 
International Law, 24 CONN. J. INT’L L. 201, 213 (2009) (recognizing the tension 
created by empowering ethnic minorities over other minorities or individuals, but 
finding that practical goals of peace and stability favor such an approach). 
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Though the Declaration represents a standard for a nation’s 
treatment of indigenous group rights, it also invites nations to allow 
indigenous groups to make membership decisions without host-
nation review by granting the indigenous group the right to self-
determination.115 When viewing membership decisions solely in 
terms of preserving self-determination for the collective, the 
balancing seen in Kitok may not occur.116 The HRC considered and 
weighed the petitioner’s individual right and deemed such a denial as 
reasonably and objectively necessary for the viability of the 
collective as a whole.117 By considering the petitioner’s individual 
human rights, the HRC recognized the inadequacy of analyzing 
membership governance disputes solely in terms of internal self-
governance and collective self-determination.118 Though ultimately 
decided against the petitioner under the deferential analysis of Santa 
Clara and the Declaration, the entire inquiry may have ended once 
internal self-governance was implicated.119 
Vigorous enforcement of collective rights without respect to 
individual rights runs the risk of fostering resentment by non-
members towards indigenous groups and thereby undermining the 
goals of the Declaration.120 The rationale for the adoption of 
 
 115. See Declaration, supra note 1, art. 4 (“Indigenous peoples . . . have the right 
to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local 
affairs . . .”); Wiessner, supra note 2, at 1174 (including local and internal self-
government as essential to providing an appropriate legal framework within which 
indigenous peoples rights are respected). 
 116. See 1987 HRC Decision, supra note 61, at 230 (employing a balancing 
approach to resolve the apparent conflict between the legislation, which protects 
the minority as a whole and the application of that legislation, which can adversely 
affect individual members of that minority). 
 117. Id. (holding that the restriction of Mr. Kitok’s reindeer herding rights were 
not disproportionate to the legitimate goals of the legislation to protect the welfare 
of the whole Sami community). 
 118. See id. (eschewing resolving the conflict between collective and individual 
rights solely in terms of collective rights). 
 119. Compare Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 64 (1978) (finding 
that federal review of tribal membership decisions would clearly undermine tribal 
self-government and would also fail to address petitioner’s individual rights), with 
1987 HRC Decision, supra note 61, at 230 (discussing the implications of the 
legislation protecting Sami breeding rights on the petitioner’s individual rights, 
despite the potential encroachment on tribal self-government decisions). 
 120. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 9, at 287 (recounting the moral controversy 
inspired by conflict between U.S. federal child protection laws and tribal control of 
children born within the tribe). 
2011] COLLECTIVE V. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 505 
collective rights was that individual rights were not sufficient to 
protect indigenous groups from assimilative pressures.121 Once 
collective rights are perceived as granting more than is arguably 
necessary, the nation granting those rights may come under criticism 
for uneven enforcement of individual human rights.122  
As indigenous peoples travel along the path of self-determination 
and experience more success and prosperity, the special protections 
and benefits they enjoy will become increasingly desirable to those 
with a plausible claim to membership.123 Despite a present dearth of 
examples of membership disputes being litigated, disputes may 
become more commonplace in the near future, as seen in the United 
States with the rise of potential casino-derived income and increases 
in disenrollment rates.124 A balanced approach to weighing individual 
rights against the collective right will help ensure that the principles 
of the Declaration can live up to the aspirational standard it purports 
to represent.125 
B. HOST-NATION REVIEW OF INDIGENOUS MEMBERSHIP DECISIONS 
 HELPS ENSURE INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS ARE RESPECTED 
AND DOES NOT UNNECESSARILY UNDERMINE THE GOALS OF SELF-
 DETERMINATION.  
Kitok, Lovelace, and Santa Clara each offer insight into how 
courts resolve indigenous group membership disputes.126 All three 
 
 121. See Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of 
International Law, 80 AM. J. INT’L. L. 369, 371 (stating that the partial basis for 
the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations was the notion that existing 
human rights were either inadequate or not fully applied). 
 122. See Reitman, supra note 43, at 849-50 (describing the dual economic 
benefit that comes with tribal membership: income derived from the tribe itself and 
income derived from federal subsidies granted to tribes). 
 123. See, e.g., Cowan, supra note 110, at 27-30 (leaving control of access to 
tribal membership to the tribes themselves does not provide an adequate 
substantive remedy to individuals affected by membership denial decisions). 
 124. See Patrice H. Kunesh, Banishment as Cultural Justice in Contemporary 
Tribal Legal Systems, 37 N.M. L. REV. 85, 136 (2007) (noting the obvious 
correlation between tribal economic success and desirability of tribal membership). 
 125. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 9, at 288 (theorizing that “points of 
reconciliation” between individual and collective moral rights will prove that 
implementation of collective legal rights can alleviate concern about the potentially 
adverse affect that the growth of collective human rights law will have on 
individual rights). 
 126. See discussion supra Part II.F (discussing court decisions considering 
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cases exhibit deference to collective rights, which the Declaration 
encourages; however, each differs with respect to the level of 
deference and the system of review over such membership 
decisions.127 The three decisions are the subject of considerable 
discussion among indigenous rights commentators,128 but in order to 
ensure that individual human rights are not sacrificed in the name of 
collective self-determination, a state forum competent to review 
indigenous membership decisions is required, as seen in Kitok and 
Lovelace.129 
Kitok stands apart in describing a system that maintains deference 
to indigenous group rights to self-determination while ensuring that 
individual human rights are respected through host-nation review.130 
In Lovelace, a government gender-based rule impermissibly denied a 
woman access to her culture.131 Similarly, in Santa Clara a rule 
enforced by an indigenous sovereign was found to be unreviewable 
by the government.132 However, in contrast, Kitok presents a 
government rule based on financial interests of the indigenous group, 
reviewable by the group in the first instance, and appealable to the 
government.133  
While it would be a step backwards for indigenous rights 
proponents to encourage full host-nation government creation and 
control of membership criteria, host-nation review of indigenous 
 
indigenous group membership disputes). 
 127. See discussion supra Part II.F (finding that Santa Clara demonstrates total 
deference to indigenous control while Kitok and Lovelace exhibit national systems 
that provide for host-nation control or review of such decisions). 
 128. See Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 207-16 (discussing Kitok, Lovelace, and 
Santa Clara as indicative of some of the misgivings of indigenous groups 
regarding Article 27 of the Declaration). 
 129. See discussion infra Part III.B (arguing that host-nation review of 
indigenous membership decisions helps ensure individual human rights are 
respected and does not unnecessarily undermine the goals of self-determination). 
 130. See 1987 HRC Decision, supra note 61, at 230 (expressing concern for the 
rights of the individual petitioner and employing a balancing test to ensure that the 
restriction upon the petitioner’s rights was both reasonably and objectively 
justified, and was necessary for the welfare of the minority as a whole). 
 131. See discussion, supra Part II.F (discussing the Lovelace case in which a 
woman was denied membership due to her previous marriage to a non-member). 
 132. See discussion, supra Part II.F (discussing the Santa Clara case where a 
woman’s children were denied membership by the tribal group because their father 
was a non-member). 
 133. See discussion, supra Part II.F. 
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group-created membership criteria would not undermine the goals of 
self-determination.134 The petitioner in all three cases was denied 
access to their own culture, but it appears that only when the 
government creates, as in Lovelace, or is able to review the 
membership rule, as in Kitok, that consideration of individual human 
rights occurs.135 In Santa Clara, the host nation entrusted the 
balancing of rights to the indigenous group itself, but in doing so also 
removed a forum for review of such decisions.136 Just as indigenous 
groups increasingly turn to international courts to provide objective 
review of disputes between themselves and their host nation,137 in 
cases of membership denial an individual should be able to seek 
review of indigenous group membership decisions in a neutral forum 
provided by the host nation to help ensure that a reasonable and 
objective justification is provided.138 
In order to preserve individual human rights, those adversely 
affected by an indigenous group membership decision should be able 
to appeal to the government of the host nation.139 Recognition that 
host-nation integrity is superior to the indigenous collective right of 
 
 134. See Reitman, supra note 43, at 862-63 (arguing that review of indigenous 
group membership decisions is the host nation’s affirmative duty in order to 
protect indigenous groups). 
 135. See, e.g., Christina L. Brandt-Young, Multicultural Jurisdictions at the 
National and International Levels, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 241, 242-56 (2002) 
(reviewing AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL 
DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS (2001)) (employing Lovelace and Kitok to 
discuss the author’s proposed solutions to the tension caused by encounters 
between women’s rights movements and inflexible traditional culture protected by 
indigenous group rights). 
 136. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 73 (1978) (White, J., 
dissenting) (taking issue with the majority failing to provide a federal forum for 
vindication of a federally granted right). 
 137. See, e.g., Wiessner, supra note 2, at 1152-55 (documenting the change 
within international law by recognizing the rights of indigenous groups and 
granting indigenous groups means for protecting those rights). 
 138. See, e.g., Reitman, supra note 43, at 863 (noting the absurdity of either 
extreme of severely restricting a tribe’s authority to determine citizenship or 
granting a tribe unfettered membership power to point out that federal review of 
membership decisions should be required). 
 139. See, e.g., Kunesh, supra note 124, at 89-91 (2007) (recommending federal 
review of tribal banishment decisions based on comity of nations and exhaustion of 
tribal remedies, and arguing that such review achieves the important tribal 
objectives of preserving traditional tribal values and practices while upholding 
tribal self-government). 
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self-determination is already incorporated in the Declaration’s 
provisions to expressly disclaim any impact on territorial sovereignty 
as a concession to the African nations.140 Though objectively these 
provisions expressly limit the concept of self-determination in order 
to preclude secession from the host nation, the same rationale 
supports host-nation review of membership decisions.141 In that 
respect, the host nation and its court systems would consistently be 
held as the nation’s final arbiter before proceeding to international 
review.142 Otherwise, one would think that logically a membership 
dispute by an individual would go from indigenous group straight to 
an international forum, bypassing the host nation and undermining its 
authority and territorial integrity.143 Providing for host-nation review 
does not undermine indigenous group control of internal self-
governance any more than disclaimers providing that regardless of 
the actions of the host nation, the indigenous group will not secede 
from the nation.144 
This review process will not impact the indigenous group’s right 
to self-determination as long as sufficient deference is given to the 
indigenous group’s decisions.145 Deference is a concept well 
 
 140. See Wiessner, supra note 2, at 1160 (indicating that the incorporation of 
Article 45 of the Declaration was an attempt to quell the African nations’ fears that 
borders imposed since colonial times could be re-opened for dispute, absent 
language limiting the concept of indigenous self-determination in Article 3). 
 141. See, e.g., Kunesh, supra note 124, at 138 (noting that tribal courts, similar 
to other foreign nations granted comity by US courts, must guarantee basic due 
process rights to members). 
 142. See, e.g., id. at 143-44 (concluding that the comity-exhaustion device 
sufficiently addresses the interests at stake—tribal sovereignty, culture, and self-
government as well as individual ICRA and due process rights—in allowing the 
national government to be the final arbiter of tribal membership disputes). 
 143. Cf. Wiessner, supra note 2, at 1160-61 (describing the fear held by African 
nations that pursuing self-determination to its logical end could create threats to 
existing territorial integrity). 
 144. See Declaration, supra note 1, art. 46 (seeking recognition of self-
determination for indigenous groups while prohibiting actions which may 
undermine "political unity" of the host nation). But see Newman, supra note 9, at 
279 (forecasting that Anaya's theory will likely not assuage critics of collective 
rights by simply saying that collective rights do not threaten previously existing 
individual human rights because balancing of competing rights has always 
occurred). 
 145. See, e.g., Reuter, supra note 114, at 229 (finding the recognition of limited 
autonomy for indigenous groups to be desirable and consistent with recent trends 
in minority rights, as the lack of such limits could lead to ethnic conflicts and grave 
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articulated by courts in many contexts ranging from the deference 
appeals courts give to trial judges in decisions pertaining to admitting 
evidence,146 to the deference given by the HRC and the Swedish 
court system to the Sami indigenous group in its decision not to re-
enroll Kitok.147 Oversight and reasonable limitations on indigenous 
group control of membership decisions will help avoid the potential 
for abuse of generally accepted individual rights of access to culture 
in the name of preserving the collective identity of the group.148  
The overarching goal of the Declaration is respect for an 
indigenous group’s right to exist as a distinct, self-governing 
community with the right to fully participate in host-nation decisions 
affecting its way of life.149 As the indigenous community seeks 
assurances that the host nation fairly grants access to the political 
process which affects their group, the individual with ethnic ties to 
such a community is justified in seeking assurance that the group 
fairly grants access to the political process which affects their 
membership status.150 As the indigenous community turns to the 
international courts to occasionally review disputes between the 
community and the host nation,151 the individual should in turn be 
 
human rights violations such as genocide). 
 146. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984) (citing the Federal Rules 
of Evidence as requiring that an appellate court afford the trial court “wide 
discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence”). 
 147. See 1987 HRC Decision, supra note 61, at 223, 230 (discussing the 
Reindeer Act’s deference to Sami membership decisions, and ultimately holding 
that the Act did not violate the ICCPR’s guarantee that an individual may enjoy his 
or her own culture). 
 148. See Reitman, supra note 43, at 863 (defining the roles of federally 
recognized tribes as sovereign political entities to which the federal government 
owes a duty of protection; thereby concluding that tribal abuses of membership 
decisions, which could undermine their own continued existence, must be 
actionable by the federal government). 
 149. See Kunesh, supra note 124, at 143-44 (proposing federal review of tribal 
banishment decisions based on principles of fairness and deference to tribal 
traditions as the best solution for tribal abuse of plenary power of membership 
decisions). 
 150. See id. at 131-33 (providing an example showing that sometimes internal 
conflicts regarding the direction of the tribe have resulted in banishments as a form 
of political reprisal, seriously undermining individual human rights and freedom of 
participation in the tribe’s political process). 
 151. See Wiessner, supra note 2, at 1152-54 (summarizing the past half century 
of increased active participation by proponents of indigenous rights on the 
international stage). 
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able to turn to the host nation to occasionally review disputes 
between the individual and the community.152  
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INDIGENOUS GROUPS SHOULD CEDE SOME CONTROL OF 
INDIGENOUS GROUP MEMBERSHIP DECISIONS TO THE HOST NATION. 
While the history of treatment of indigenous peoples justifies 
zealous defense of any perceived abrogation of indigenous peoples’ 
rights,153 advocates should not lose sight of a rational basis to justify 
collective rights as necessarily separate from individual human 
rights.154 The original international human rights instruments aspired 
to craft universal human rights that would protect all individuals 
from discrimination and oppression irrespective of their group 
memberships.155 With the Declaration, advocates of indigenous 
peoples’ rights created an instrument that protects groups from 
discrimination and oppression.156 Human rights issues of the 
individual and collective are receiving ever increasing attention both 
domestically and internationally.157 
As host nations are ultimately responsible to all their respective 
citizens for individual human rights, they should ensure that 
collective rights infringe on individual rights only when required by 
 
 152. See Kunesh, supra note 124, at 137 (advocating the use of the principles of 
comity to ensure proper respect of foreign sovereign judgments while balancing 
the interests of each nation). 
 153. See generally EagleWoman, supra note 33, at 388-406 (reinforcing the 
point that despite advances in tribal rights throughout history, European and U.S. 
policy undermined tribal economic development by not fully embracing tribal 
sovereignty). 
 154. See generally Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 244-45 (calling attention to the 
issues that arise from adding indigenous group claims as a new conceptually 
distinct category in a field already occupied with other minority and gender rights). 
 155. See Gibson, supra note 12, at 294 (noting that minority rights were 
deliberately omitted from the UDHR because rights to culture were thought to be 
achievable through universal individual human rights). 
 156. See Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 37 (claiming the Declaration offers 
legal protections from state action, such as genocide and forced assimilation, 
aimed at diminishing an indigenous group’s integrity as a distinct group). 
 157. See Reuter, supra note 114, at 236 (finding that the international 
community failed in the creation of a unified legal approach with standardized 
guidelines to resolving the increasing claims of ethnic groups in international law). 
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a reasonable and objective justification.158 As recognized in 
Lovelace, having access to one’s ethnic community is enshrined in 
Article 27 of the ICCPR as a fundamental human right.159 When 
indigenous groups are afforded special rights or privileges such as 
land use and protections, they take on an additional responsibility to 
not deny the privileges that flow from membership absent sufficient 
cause.160 The nation which allows the indigenous group to retain and 
sometimes grant these privileges also has an interest in overseeing 
membership governance.161  
In light of growing international recognition of indigenous peoples 
and their unique circumstances, indigenous groups should encourage 
host nation participation by allowing judicial review of decisions, 
such as in Kitok.162 This may be accomplished through laws enacted 
by the host nation being drafted with the participation of the 
indigenous groups.163 Although indigenous sovereignty and self-
determination should be fiercely guarded against encroachment by 
arbitrary national laws, absolute deference to indigenous sovereigns 
opens the host nation up to criticism on individual human rights 
grounds.164 However, as long as proper deference is given to 
 
 158. See, e.g., Reitman, supra note 43, at 796 (contrasting the legal obstacles a 
host nation faces when attempting to forcibly revoke a person’s citizenship with 
the ease with which indigenous communities may banish one of its members). 
 159. See 1981 HRC Decision, supra note 69, at 87 (recognizing that a state’s 
restrictions on the right to residence, when it unreasonably interferes with the right 
of access to one’s native culture, constitutes a breach of the right to enjoy one’s 
culture); see also ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 27 (stating that “persons belonging to 
such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members 
of their group, to enjoy their own culture”). 
 160. See, e.g., Cowan, supra note 110, at 1 (noting that when indigenous peoples 
take on governmental powers, their host government can potentially be responsible 
for the indigenous groups' human rights violations). 
 161. See, e.g., id. at 42 (proposing that “[t]ribal violations of U.S. international 
human rights obligations are attributable to the United States because the tribes . . . 
fall under the rubric of State organs”). 
 162. See Kunesh, supra note 124, at 145 (arguing that the uncertainty and 
unfairness surrounding the existence and protection of individual human rights 
within membership decisions by tribes leads to fear, distrust, and contempt). 
 163. See Reitman, supra note 43, at 848-50 (noting that because all indigenous 
peoples are also citizens of their host nation, subjecting membership decisions to 
judicial review by the host nation is already within the host nation’s authority). 
 164. See Cowan, supra note 110, at 43 (concluding that because it is possible for 
the United States to be held accountable for tribes’ human rights violations, tribal 
governments should take measures to incorporate human rights protections to 
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indigenous group membership decisions, host-nation review will not 
unnecessarily undermine the group’s right to self-determination. 
B. THE DECLARATION SHOULD BE AMENDED TO CLEARLY REFLECT 
INDIGENOUS CONTROL COUPLED WITH HOST-NATION REVIEW OF 
TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP DECISIONS. 
The Declaration advocates self-determination of internal matters 
without providing for host-nation review.165 The failure to address 
dissenters’ concerns regarding the balancing of individual and group 
human rights resulted in four of the largest indigenously populated 
nations voting against the Declaration’s adoption and profusely 
disclaiming any legal effect on the state of the law of indigenous 
peoples.166 Since the Declaration was amended to accommodate the 
African states’ concerns that indigenous groups could use the 
Declaration as a platform from which to justify secession from the 
nation state, the Declaration should be further amended to reflect the 
HRC’s decisions in Kitok and Lovelace, which support deference for 
tribal membership decisions made initially by the indigenous group 
coupled with the opportunity for host–nation review.167 Such 
assurances would reign in critiques that the Declaration is overly 
expansive and would also help alleviate the dissenters’ concern that 
the Declaration’s version of self-determination goes too far and 
encourages political independence from the host nation.168 
Santa Clara is the most deferential policy regarding host-nation 
 
protect their sovereignty from “more intrusive federal restrictions and oversight”). 
 165. See discussion supra Part III.A (arguing that by linking internal self-
governance to self-determination, which established control over membership 
decisions as a key collective right without also providing for a meaningful review 
for those decisions, the Declaration failed to appropriately balance collective rights 
with individual rights). 
 166. See Hagen, supra note 5 (expressing the rejection by the United States of 
any possibility that the Declaration, as an aspirational document, is or could ever 
become binding as customary international law). 
 167. See discussion supra Part III.B (arguing that host-nation review of 
indigenous membership decisions helps ensure that individual human rights are 
respected and does not unnecessarily undermine the goals of self-determination). 
 168. See, e.g., Pasqualucci, supra note 41, at 51-54 (reporting that while the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights largely conforms to the Declaration’s 
principles, the Court diverges from the Declaration’s expansive proclamations of 
indigenous rights in relation to a State’s appropriation of natural resources on 
indigenous lands). 
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non-interference with indigenous group membership decisions 
because it leaves individuals without a remedy under the courts of 
the government which granted the rights.169 Though celebrated by 
domestic Indian law scholars, the policy opens the United States to 
criticism internationally as the balance between collective and 
individual human rights becomes customary international law.170 As 
parties to international human rights instruments, host nations are 
responsible to ensure that their individual citizens are able to exercise 
their rights.171 Since indigenous members are also citizens of the host 
nation, they should be able to appeal adverse membership decisions 
to the host nation’s courts pursuant to self-determination rights, as 
well as individual human rights, in order to better shape the evolution 
of the law.172 
CONCLUSION 
Indigenous peoples must proactively address issues raised by 
powerful host nations. Given the history of oppression which only in 
recent decades gave way to an era of self-determination, indigenous 
peoples should take care not to let the pendulum swing too far in 
their favor. When host nations grant indigenous peoples special 
rights and privileges, non-member citizens will increasingly take 
notice of who is afforded those benefits. The Declaration, although it 
already recognizes the importance of indigenous control of 
 
 169. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 83 (1978) (White, J., 
dissenting) (“And once it has been decided that an individual does possess certain 
rights vis-à-vis his government, it necessarily follows that he has some way to 
enforce those rights.”). 
 170. See, e.g., Note, International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal 
Indian Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1751, 1756-60 (2003) (asserting that indigenous 
groups’ right to cultural integrity is a powerful example of the interaction between 
general customary international law and other legal norms which result in a legal 
norm being accorded the status of customary international law). 
 171. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 12, at 285-89 (arguing that the host nation is 
obligated to maintain and protect the indigenous community’s cultural knowledge 
in order to maintain the ability of the individual to enjoy participation and access to 
that community knowledge). 
 172. See, e.g., John D. Smelcer, Comment, Using International Law More 
Effectively to Secure and Advance Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: Towards 
Enforcement in U.S. and Australian Domestic Courts, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 
301, 305-06 (2006) (encouraging the use of international instruments as persuasive 
authority in domestic courts in order to speed the process of such international 
instruments developing into customary international law). 
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membership decisions, should be amended to take into account 
individual human rights found in the ICCPR and other individual 
human rights instruments. In host nations where indigenous groups 
are afforded special rights, leaving ultimate review of membership 
decisions under the purview of the host nation helps immunize 
indigenous groups from potential criticism. It is vital to the continued 
success of indigenous groups to gain the support of powerful nations 
such as the United States, and advocate for a system which respects 
both collective and individual rights, even when the current doctrine 
goes too far in deferring to the indigenous group. 
 
